Our task of quantum list decoding for a classical block code is to recover from a given quantumly corrupted codeword a short list containing all messages whose codewords have high "presence" in this quantumly corrupted codeword. All known families of efficiently quantum list decodable codes, nonetheless, have exponentially-small message rate. We show that certain generalized Reed-Solomon codes concatenated with Hadamard codes of polynomially-small rate and constant codeword alphabet size have efficient quantum list decoding algorithms, provided that target codewords should have relatively high presence in a given quantumly corrupted codeword.
Introduction
Classical list decoding, which was rooted in the late 1950s by Elias [3] and Wozencraft [18] , has drawn significant attention since Sudan's [15] discovery of an efficient list decoding algorithm for Reed-Solomon codes beyond its "traditional" error-correction radius. List decoding has since then found useful applications to cryptography as well as complexity theory (see, e.g., a survey article [16] ).
Quantum list decoding dealing with classical block codes first arose in connection to quantum hardcore functions in a seminal paper by Kawachi and Yamakami [12] (following an early result of Adcock and Cleve [1] on biased oracles) in the so-called implicitinput explicit-output model, in which we wish to output a list of messages with oracle access to a quantum encoding procedure which produces a quantum superposition of corrupted codewords. This model differs from the conventional error-correction model between a sender and a receiver through a noisy channel. In contrast, we are given a (possibly) faulty quantum algorithm (known as a quantum-computationally corrupted codeword or quantumly corrupted codeword) which encodes a classical message to a certain quantum state representing a quantum corruption of the correct codeword. It is in general hard to recover the original message from such a quantumly corrupted codeword; however, we may be able to produce a reasonably small list that contains all messages whose codewords are close proximity to the given quantumly corrupted codeword. This closeness is scaled by the notion of presence, which expresses the average probability of obtaining each block of the target codeword from the quantumly corrupted codeword. (See [12] for an intuition behind this notion.) This is the primary purpose of quantum list decoding. A natural question is: what types of classical block codes are efficiently quantum list decodable?
There are known families of block codes that are efficiently quantum list decodable with arbitrary presence. The first known example is Hadamard codes. In classical list decoding, Goldreich and Levin [5] showed the classical list decodability of the binary Hadamard codes and subsequently Goldreich, Rubinfeld, and Sudan [6] gave a general list decoding algorithm for the q-ary Hadamard codes. Concerning quantum list decoding, Adcock and Cleve [1] essentially proved that the binary Hadamard codes are quantum list decodable in polynomial time. For the q-ary Hadamard codes, a fast quantum list decoding algorithm was recently given by Kawachi and Yamakami [12] . They also presented two additional quantum list decodable codes: shifted Legendre symbol codes and pairwise equality codes. All these codes, nonetheless, have exponentially-small rate, where the (message) rate of a code is a ratio of message length and codeword's block length. This paper is motivated by the question of whether there exists a family of efficiently quantum list decodable codes of polynomially-small rate and constant codeword alphabet size, because such a code family finds useful applications to quantum complexity theory (an example will be seen in Section 5). Natural candidates are well-studied Reed-Solomon codes. They have relatively large rate; however, they usually have large alphabet size. A standard way to build a code of large rate but small alphabet size is to concatenate two codes of good properties. We claim that concatenating generalized Reed-Solomon codes with Hadamard codes gives the desired codes, assuming that the generalized Reed-Solomon codes are efficiently quantum list decodable. This claim is proven by employing in Section 3 a technique of constructing a "quantum reduction" between two quantumly corrupted codewords. Note that this technique requires no soft information, which is a key ingredient in the classical case of [7, 8] .
Are the generalized Reed-Solomon codes efficiently quantum list decodable? A direct and simple approach toward their quantum list decoding is an application of the polynomial reconstruction algorithm of Guruswami and Sudan [7] . When codeword presence in a quantumly corrupted codeword is relatively high, we can show in Section 4 how to construct a quantum list decoding algorithm for the generalized Reed-Solomon codes. As the presence becomes lower, however, it seems harder to solve efficiently the quantum list decoding problem for the generalized Reed-Solomon codes, because its efficient list decoding leads to the unexpected consequence that every NP-problem can be efficiently solved on a quantum computer with high success probability. There is also a direct connection between quantum list decodability of the generalized Reed-Solomon codes and quantum solvability of two classical problems: the noisy polynomial interpolation problem (NPIP) [13] and the bounded distance vector problem (BDVP).
To a certain type of application, our quantum list decoding algorithm for the aforementioned concatenated code is still applicable. Our example is the QCMA search problem, in which we want to find a classical witness of polynomial size that forces a given polynomial-time quantum algorithm to accept with high probability. We show in Section 5 that solving this search problem on average implies solving it in worst case.
Finally, we make a brief discussion on the notion of local quantum list decoding based on an implicit-input implicit-output model where an outcome of a list decoder is a list of descriptions of quantum circuit listdecoders. Similar to the classical case of [17] , we can apply our quantum list decoder for the generalized Reed-Solomon codes to do local quantum list decoding for Reed-Müller codes from quantumly corrupted codewords. As an immediate consequence, we can prove the so-called hardness amplification of quantum circuits, following the argument of [17] .
Foundations of Quantum List Decoding
This section explains basic notions and notation concerning quantum list decoding. Throughout this paper, let N denote the set of all nonnegative integers and set N + = N − {0}. For any positive integers m, n with m ≤ n, let [m, n] Z denote the set {m, m+ 1, m+ 2, . . . , n} and let [n] be short for [1, n] Z if n ≥ 1.
Classical Block Codes
We briefly explain classical block (error-correcting) codes, which are objects of our interest. Roughly speaking, a code is a set of strings of the same length over a finite alphabet Σ and each string of a code is indexed by a message and is called a codeword. In this paper, we are mostly focused on a family of codes, each of which corresponds to a different message length n in N. Such a code family is in general specified by a series (Σ n , I n , Γ n ) of message space Σ n , index set I n , and code alphabet Γ n for each message length n (which serves as a "basis parameter" in this paper).
As standard in complexity theory, a code C is viewed as a function that, for each message length n, maps Σ n × I n to Γ n . Let N (n) = |Σ n | and q(n) = |Γ n |. It is convenient to assume that Σ n = (Σ ′ n ) n so that n actually represents the length of messages in Σ n over the message alphabet Σ ′ n ; in this case, n = ⌈log |Σ ′ n | N (n)⌉ for each n ∈ N. By abbreviating C(x, y) as C x (y), we treat C x (·) as a function mapping I n to Γ n and is called a codeword, where the block length M (n) of such a codeword is |I n |. For simplicity, we often assume that I n = {0, 1, . . . , M (n) − 1} so that each element of I n can be expressed in ⌈log 2 M (n)⌉ bits. We freely identify C x with the vec-
We mainly work on a finite field and we often regard Γ n as the finite field F q(n) (= GF(q(n))) of order q(n).
The (message) rate of C is defined to be the ratio n/M (n). The (Hamming) distance d(C x , C y ) between two codewords C x and C y is the number of non-zero components in the vector C x − C y . The minimal distance d(C) of a code C is the smallest distance between any pair of distinct codewords in C. In contrast, ∆(C x , C y ) denotes the relative (Hamming) 
of the code of message length n is emphasized). We may drop a length parameter n from both subscript and argument place whenever we discuss a set of codewords with a "fixed" n.
Hadamard Codes HAD. Let n be any message length, used as a parameter, and let q be any prime number. A q-ary Hadamard code family HAD (q) = {HAD (q,n) } n∈N consists of (q n , n, q n − q n−1 ) q -codes obtained as follows. For each message
(Normalized) Generalized Reed-Solomon Codes GRS. Let q be any prime and let k, n be any positive integers with n ≤ k ≤ q. A (normalized) generalized Reed-Solomon code family GRS = {GRS (k,n,q) } n,k∈N consists of all (k, n, k − n + 1) q -codes obtained as follows.
n be any message and let D k be a set of k distinct elements
Quantumly Corrupted Codewords and Codeword Presence
We are mostly concerned with a quantum corruption that occurs during a quantum procedure of encoding messages into codewords. The process of such a quantum corruption can be described as a certain type of unitary map. Formally, a quantum-computationally corrupted codeword (or quantumly corrupted codeword) is a unitary operatorÕ, with two fixed function parameters l(n) and m(n) mapping N to N, that satisfies the following condition: for any three strings r ∈ Σ n , s ∈ Σ l(n) , and t ∈ Σ m(n) , there exists a unit vector |φ r,z of length m(n) such that
where the notation |t ⊕ φ r,z is shorthand for w∈Σ m(n) w|φ r,z |t ⊕ w and ⊕ is the bitwise XOR. The presence of codeword C x inÕ, denoted PreÕ(C x ), is the average probability of obtaining the correct values C x (r) over all indices r ∈ I n ; namely, PreÕ(C x ) = 1 M r |α r,Cx(r) | 2 . See [12] for an intuition behind these notions.
We further expand the notions of presence and distance. Let n be any message length. Define W n to be the set of all vectors w = (w r,z ) r,z ∈ [0, 1]
(which is viewed as a "measured" quantumly cor-
We embed this codeword a into
r,z = 1 if a(r) = z and 0 otherwise. Moreover, for any code (i.e., a subset of V n ) * In some literature, the notation (M(n), Γn) q(n) is used instead.
First, we expand the notion of presence. For any a ∈ V n and any vector w ∈ W n , define Pre w (a) = 1 M(n) v(a)|w , where ·|· denotes the standard inner product. Second, we expand the notion of the (Hamming) distance. For any pair v, w ∈ W n , define d(v, w) = M (n) − v|w . This new definition clearly expands the standard notion of the distance d(·, ·) because, for any a, b ∈ V n , we have
Notice that, for any a ∈ V n and any vector w ∈ W n ,
Presence Versus Minimal Distance
A relatively good upper bound on the value of presence is shown in [12] by following a geometric method of Guruswami and Sudan [9] , who gave a q-ary extension of Johnson bound. Let C be any (M (n), n, d(n)) q(n) -code family with message space Σ n and define
where "sup" is taken over all quantumly corrupted wordÕ for C.
Lemma 2.1 [12]
Let n be any message length.
To derive an asymptotic bound from this lemma, we introduce QL poly (λ), which indicates the minimal possible presence for a family of quantum list decodable codes of minimal relative distance λ having only a polynomial-size message list. Let
For each pair w ∈ W n and ε
}. Moreover, for any function set F , we define P re(C, F ) = inf l∈F {P re(C, l)}.
For any function l and any value λ, let QL l (λ) = inf C:∆(C)≥λ {P re(C, l)}, where 
1/2 and thus,
Proof.
Consider the case where the upper bound given in Lemma 2.1 is at most an c . For readability, we omit the parameter "n" in the following calculation.
We then obtain the inequality
which is equivalent to
The term |ε − 1/q| is thus lower-bounded by
Assuming that ε ≥ 1/q, the proposition follows immediately from the relation
It is still open whether the equality QL poly (λ) =
Implicit-Input Explicit-Output Model
List decoding has been modeled in several different ways in the past literature. This paper chiefly uses the model that takes quantumly corrupted codewords implicitly as an oracle and outputs hidden messages explicitly. Upon this implicit-input explicit-output model, the quantum list decoding problem (QLDP) for a code C is described in the following fashion. First, let C be any (M (n), n, d(n)) q(n) -code family with message space Σ n and let O be any set of quantumly corrupted codewords for C. Take a bias parameter ε(n).
ε-Quantum List Decoding Problem (ε-QLDP) for Code C w.r.t. O • Input: a message length n and a value 1/ε(n).
• Implicit Input: an oracleÕ ∈ O representing a quantumly corrupted codeword for C.
• Output: a list of messages including all messages x ∈ Σ n that satisfy the inequality PreÕ(C x ) ≥ 1/q(n) + ε(n). For convenience, we refer to such a list as a valid list for the ε-QLDP.
Our goal is to solve this ε-QLDP using quantum computation with oracle access to a quantumly corrupted codeword in O with success probability at least δ(n), which is given as a confidence parameter. Now, let us introduce the notion of quantum list decoding algorithm that works with bias ε and confidence δ. Definition 2.3 (quantum list decoding) Let C be any code family, let ε(n) be any bias parameter, and let δ(n) be any confidence parameter. A quantum list decoding algorithm (or a quantum list decoder) for C with bias ε and confidence δ is a quantum algorithm A that solves the ε-QLDP for C with success probability at least δ(n). If A also runs in time polynomial in (n, 1/ε(n), 1/δ(n)), it is called a polynomial-time quantum list decoding algorithm for C.
The list size of a quantum list decoding algorithm refers to the maximal size of a valid list produced by the algorithm.
Remark: In certain applications, list size plays a crucial role. For instance, if a quantum list decoder produces a valid list L with probability at least δ(n), it is possible to specify a hidden message x uniquely with the same success probability with help of "advice" of log |Σ| |L| size over message alphabet Σ.
In the rest of this subsection, we discuss a simple connection between one-way functions and the QLDPs. To begin with, we introduce the notion of a one-way function of the strong form, which we preferably call super one-way.
Definition 2.4 (quantum super one-wayness)
A function f is called quantum super one-way if (i) there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A such that A|x |0 = |x |f (x) |φ x for a certain quantum state |φ x and (ii) for any positive polynomial p and any polynomial-time quantum algorithm B, the probability that B|f (x) |φ x outputs x is at most 1/p(n).
Remark: The "standard" one-wayness requires that B|f (x) outputs x with negligible probability whereby the information |φ x is hidden from the adversary B who tries to invert f . Our new notion indicates that B hardly outputs x even though |φ x is given besides f (x) as supplemental information.
A typical example of a quantum super one-way function is a quantum one-way permutation because, for a permutation, we can replace |φ x in Definition 2.4 with |0 m by uncomputing a deterministic procedure that computes f (x) from x.
Lemma 2.5 No polynomial-time quantum list decodable code with polynomially-small confidence is quantum super one-way.
Proof. Let f be a quantum super one-way function with its length function m(n) ∈ n O(1) (i.e., |f (x)| = m(|x|)). Consider an (m(n), n, d(n)) q(n) -code C and let C x (r) denote the rth bit (f (x)) r of f (x).
Take a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A computing C and assume that A|x |r |0 m(n) |0 m = |x |r |C x (r) |φ x for a certain quantum state |φ x . Fix x arbitrarily and defineÕ|r |s |t = |r |s ⊕ C x (r) |t ⊕ φ x for each pair (s, t) of strings. Toward a contradiction, assume that C has a polynomial-time quantum list decoder B with polynomially-small confidence. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Prob B [BÕ(0 n ) = x] ≥ 1/p(n) for a certain fixed positive polynomial p. Convert this B to an algorithm that inverts f as follows. On input |f (x) |φ x , where y ∈ range(f ), run B. Whenever B makes an oracle call with a query |r |s |t , generate its answer |r |s ⊕ (f (x)) r |t ⊕ φ x from the input information. Finally, output an outcome of B. This implies that f is not quantum super one-way, a contradiction. 2
Codes of Polynomially-Small Rate
A family of polynomial-time classical list decodable codes of polynomially-small rate and binary codeword alphabet finds numerous applications in the fields of cryptography and complexity theory (see, e.g., [16] ). Since all known efficiently quantum list decodable code families have exponentially-small rate, it is natural to ask whether there is any quantum list decodable code of polynomially-small rate and small alphabet size for any given bias parameter.
Concatenated Codes
A standard way of building a family of classical block codes of polynomially-small rate and small codeword alphabet size is to concatenate two codes of good
We first explain Forney's [4] notion of concatenated codes. Let us consider two codes C (1) and x 2 , . . . , x n1 ) be any message of length n 1 , where each x i is taken from Σ n2 over a q-letter alphabet Σ. Since x i can be expressed as a n 2 -letter string, x can be viewed as a string of total length n 1 n 2 over a q-letter alphabet. The code C = C 2 ⊙ C 1 , given by the inner code C (2) concatenated with the outer code C (1) , is defined as C(x, r, s) = C (2) 
For our purpose, we choose the concatenated code C GRS-H [n, q, θ] explained in [8] . as an inner code. The desired code
(design distance). We have the bound log(1/θ) log q ≤ m ≤ n, which further implies that q m ≤ n log q θ log(1/θ) . Therefore, as far as θ = O(1/p(n)) and q = O(2 p(n) ) for a certain polynomial p, q m is upper-bounded by O(n 2 p(n) 2 ). Now, we claim that C GRS-H [n, q, θ] is quantumly list decodable for an appropriate choice of parameters (n, q, θ), assuming that the generalized Reed-Solomon codes are quantumly list decodable for a specific bias parameter.
If the (q m , q m θ, (1 − θ)q m + 1) q m generalized ReedSolomon code has a quantum list decoder with bias ε ′ and confidence δ running in time polynomial in (n, q, 1/ε ′ , 1/δ, 1/θ), then C GRS-H [n, q, θ] has a quantum list decoding algorithm with bias ε and confidence δ running in time polynomial in (n, q, 1/ε ′ , 1/δ, 1/θ).
In this lemma, the value δ of the confidence of the generalized Reed-Solomon code is transferred to the concatenated code C GRS-H [n, q, θ]. The proof of the lemma is given in the subsequent subsection.
Quantum Reduction Technique
For the proof of Lemma 3.1, we wish to construct a "quantum reduction" between two quantumly corrupted codewords. It is useful to describe such a reduction, say, fromÕ toÕ ′ , as a quantum algorithm that, on each input |r |s |t , computes the outcome Õ ′ |r |s |t by making oracle calls toÕ. This can be seen as a strong form of well-known Turing reduction between two languages.
As a key lemma, we show a general result concerning the q-ary Hadamard code used as an inner code for an arbitrary outer code C. Now, let C be any (q m , n) q m -code, which is treated as a function C(x, r)
for r ∈ (F q ) m and s ∈ (F q ) m . Our goal is to construct a quantum reduction between quantumly corrupted codewordsÕ C andÕ D associated with C and D, respectively. For any unitary transform U , we conveniently say that a quantum algorithm A realizes U if, for any basis state |r , A on input |r produces the state U |r exactly.
We have the following key lemma on the code D. 
and 2. B realizesÕ C with access toÕ D as an oracle.
From the above lemma, Lemma 3.1 follows easily. We quickly sketch its proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Let (q, n, θ, m, ε, ε ′ , δ) be the parameters given in the lemma. For simplicity, write M = q m . Assume that the (M, M θ, (1 − θ)M + 1) M generalized Reed-Solomon code has a polynomialtime quantum list decoder A with bias ε ′ and confidence δ. LetÕ be any quantumly corrupted codeword for C GRS-H [n, q, θ]. We want to find all messages x that satisfy the inequality PreÕ(C GRS-H [n, q, θ] x ) ≥ 1/q + ε. By Lemma 3.2, we can reduceÕ to another quantumly corrupted codewordÕ C for the outer code GRS (M,Mθ,M) with the following presence condition:
where the last inequality follows from the bound ε 2 ≥ (q−1)
. By running a quantum list decoder for the GRS (M,Mθ,M) , we obtain a list that contains all messages x satisfying PreÕ(GRS
′ with the desired probability. 2
The proof of our key lemma (Lemma 3.2) is much more involved. We note that a simple approach using the following relation
where s (i) = 0 i−1 10 l−i , does not give the desired presence value for C x .
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let C be any (q m , n) q m -code and let D be the concatenated code HAD (q) ⊙ C. Assume that, for any r, s ∈ (F q ) m ,Õ D |r, s |0 |0 d = z∈Fq α r,s,z |r, s |z |φ r,s,z . The desired quantumly corrupted codewordÕ C can be realized by the following quantum algorithm usingÕ D as an oracle.
Quantum Algorithm B:
(1) Starting with |r |0 |0 d + |k |∆ k,r with certain amplitudes β k,r,s,z and a certain vector |∆ k,r whose last two registers contain no |0 |0
d . The amplitude β k,r,s,z is calculated as
Therefore, our state |ψ What is the norm of |∆ k,r ? Since s,z |β k,r,s,z | 2 + |∆ k,r 2 = 1, the squared norm of |∆ k,r satisfies
) If the last two registers contain |0 |0
d , multiply the content s of the third register by k to obtain k · s; otherwise, do nothing. Note that k·s is in (F q ) m since so is s. This ends the description of B.
To complete the proof, we need to evaluate the value of the presence of C x inÕ C , i.e., PreÕ
Note that z |α r,s,z | 2 = 1 for each pair (r, s 
where (r,s) ) q |α r,s,z | 2 . An argument similar to [12] shows that, for a certain
Therefore, PreÕ
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2. Proof Sketch. GivenÕ C , the following quantum algorithm A realizes the desiredÕ D .
Quantum Algorithm A:
(1) Start with the state |r |s |0 l |0 d |0 l . (2) Change the register order to obtain the state |r |0 l |0 d |s |0 l . (3) InvokeÕ C . Assume that we obtain the state |ψ 1 = z∈F q m α r,z |r |z |φ r,z |s |0 l .
(4) Compute deterministically z · s mod q from (s, z) to obtain |ψ 2 = z α r,z |r |z |φ r,z |s |z · s mod q |φ ′ s,z , where |φ ′ s,z is the garbage produced while simulating the deterministic computation in a reversible fashion. (5) Change the register order so that we obtain |ψ 3 = z α r,z |r |s |z · s mod q |z |φ r,z |φ ′ s,z .
It is not difficult to evaluate the value PreÕ
D (D x ) using PreÕ C (C x ).
Complexity of generalized Reed-Solomon Codes
We turn our interest to the question of whether the generalized Reed-Solomon codes are efficiently quantum list decodable against a given bias parameter.
We point out that a classical approach works well when the bias is relatively large; however, for smaller bias, there seems little hope in search of an efficient quantum list decoder. We also show that the generalized Reed-Solomon codes have natural connections to the noisy polynomial interpolation problem (NPIP) of Naor and Pinkas [13] and a lattice problem, which we call the bounded distance vector problem (BDVP).
A Direct and Simple Approach
A direct and simple approach toward the quantum list decoding of the (q, n, q − n + 1) q generalized ReedSolomon codes is the use of the Guruswami-Sudan polynomial reconstruction algorithm [7] . This approach works well after performing measurement on all oracle answers when bias is relatively large.
Lemma 4.1 Let n, q ∈ N and ε, ε ′ , δ ∈ (0, 1) satisfy the conditions: 2 ≤ n ≤ q, n − 2 ≤ qε ′ ≤ q − 1, and ε
q . There exists a quantum list decoding algorithm for the (q, n, q − n + 1) q generalized Reed-Solomon codes with bias ε and confidence δ running in time polynomial in (n, q, 1/δ, 1/(1 − δ)).
Proof.
Choose numbers n, q ∈ N and ε, ε ′ , δ ∈ (0, 1) to satisfy the premise of the lemma. Let O be any quantumly corrupted codeword for the GRS (q,n,q) . Now, we want to find all messages x satisfying the inequality PreÕ(GRS (q,n,q) x ) ≥ 1/q + ε. Fix such a message x arbitrarily in the following argument.
Let
It easily follows that |A ε ′ | ≥ (1−γ ε,ε ′ )q, where γ ε,ε ′ = 1−1/q−ε 1−1/q−ε ′ , because we have
Initially, set r to be 0. UsingÕ as an oracle, we iterate the following procedure by incrementing r by one. First, we make a query on r to the oracle T times, where T is the minimal integer satisfying
Notice that 1 − δ 1/q ≥ (1 − δ)/q > 0 since δ < 1. After receiving each answer fromÕ, we perform a measurement on the computational basis over F q and store a pair (r, y) if y is a result of this measurement. Since there are at most q/(1 + qε ′ ) values y with |α r,y | 2 ≥ 1/q + ε ′ , the probability P r of obtaining all such y's is bounded by
where the last inequality follows from the choice of T .
After the qth iteration, we can store at most q 2 /(1 + qε ′ ) points. Let S ε ′ be the set of all stored points. The probability that S ε ′ contains all the points (r, y) that satisfy |α r,y | 2 ≥ 1/q + ε ′ is at least r∈Fq P r ≥ δ 1/= δ. Lastly, we should find all univariate polynomials p of degree at most n − 1 that lie on at least |A ε ′ | points in S ε ′ . For this purpose, we run the wellknown Guruswami-Sudan polynomial reconstruction algorithm. Guruswami and Sudan [7] gave a deterministic algorithm A that solves in time polynomial in (m, log q) the following polynomial reconstruction problem: on input of integers m, n ′ , t and m points {(x i , y i )} i∈[m] ⊆ F q × F q , find all univariate polynomials p of degree at most n ′ which lie on at least t points, provided that t > √ mn ′ . The choice of our parameters implies that
Therefore, the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm correctly produces a list † that includes all the polynomials p of degree at most n − 1 that satisfy |α r,p(r) | 2 ≥ 1/q + ε ′ for at least (1 − γ ε,ε ′ )q indices r. Hence, the list also includes all messages x for which PreÕ(GRS
Combining the above lemma with Lemma 3.1, we obtain the proposition below.
The concatenated code C GRS-H [n, q, θ] has a quantum list decoder with bias ε and confidence δ running in time polynomial in (n, q, 1/ε, 1/δ, 1/(1 − δ)).
To use the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm in the proof of Lemma 4.1, we make the bias ε relatively large. Is there any other way to list decode the generalized Reed-Solomon codes from a quantumly corrupted codeword even for relatively small bias? We can show in the next proposition that an efficient quantum list decoder for the generalized ReedSolomon codes with arbitrary bias and high confidence can be used to solve all NP-problems efficiently on a quantum computer with high success probability. Proof. We want to give a reduction from a certain NP-complete problem to the QLDP with a specific quantumly corrupted codeword. To make our proof simple, we use the following restricted form of the interpolation problem discussed in [6] .
Constrained Interpolation Problem (CIP)
• Input: three numbers d, e, m ∈ N, a prime q, a set A = {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x m , y m )} of m points in F q × F q , given in binary.
• Question: is there any univariate polynomial p of degree at most d such that p(x 1 ) = y 1 and p(x i ) = y i for at least e different i's?
This problem is clearly in NP and is also proven to be NP-hard ‡ [6] . Now, let d, e, m ∈ N, let q be a † Actually, to obtain an output of a unique list, we need to repeat the above process.
‡ This fact is observed by examining the reduction constructed in [6] from the subset sum problem.
prime, and let A = { (x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x m , y m )} be any set of m points in F q × F q . Define D as the set {x 1 , . . . , x m } of code locators and write ℓ = |D|. Note that ℓ = (m − 1)/2 by the given condition.
Using A, we define a quantumly corrupted codewordÕ of the formÕ|x |s |t = y∈Fq α x,y |x |y ⊕ s |t for every x ∈ F q . Let (x, y) be any point in F q × F q . If (x, y) ∈ A, let α x,y = 1/ d A (x); otherwise, let α x,y = 0. Finally, let ε = ε(e, m, q) = e+2 2ℓ − 1 q . Note that ε > 0 since ℓ ≤ q. Now, we claim the following: a polynomial p of degree d passes on at least e points in A as well as the point (x 1 , y 1 ) if and only if the presence of p inÕ satisfies
Therefore, solving the CIP can be reduced to solving the ε-QLDP withÕ. Note that it takes only quantum polynomial time to realizeÕ from the set A (which is given as an input). Applying a t(n)-time quantum list decoder for the ε-QLDP with confidence 2/3, we obtain a valid list of polynomials p. The list size is at most t(n). Since the list may contain illegitimate polynomials, we need to check if each p passes on at least e + 1 different points in A including (x 1 , y 1 ). This quantum algorithm solves the CIP with success probability at least 2/3. 2
Since the inclusion NP ⊆ BQP seems unlikely, there is little hope to find a "polynomial-time" quantum list decoder for the generalized Reed-Solomon code with relatively small bias.
Noisy Polynomial Interpolation Problem
We point out that quantum list decoding of the generalized Reed-Solomon code is closely related to the noisy polynomial interpolation problem § introduced by Naor and Pinkas [13] .
Noisy Polynomial Interpolation Problem (NPIP)
• Input: three numbers k, m, n ∈ N, a prime q, n distinct points {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } in F q , and n sets S 1 , . . . , S n , each of which consists of exactly m elements from F q .
• Promise: there exists a unique polynomial p of degree at most k such that, for each i ∈ [n], there exists exactly one element y ∈ S i satisfying p(x i ) = y.
• Output: the hidden polynomial p.
Naor and Pinkas used the NPIP as an intractable assumption for a cryptographic primitive, called oblivious polynomial evaluation. Now, we prove the following. Proof. Take n distinct elements X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and n sets S 1 , . . . , S n of m elements each. Assume that the promise of the NPIP holds with a unique polynomial, say, p of degree at most k. We set the bias ε to be n q (1/m − 1/q) and let S = i∈[m] S i . Note that k, m, n ≤ q.
Let us define a quantumly corrupted codeword O as follows.
For any element x in X, say x = x i for a certain i ∈ [m], letÕ|x i |s |t = 1 √ m y∈Si δ i,y |x i |s ⊕ y |t , where δ i,y = 1 if y ∈ S i and 0 otherwise. For the other elements x outside of X, letÕ|x |s |t = 1 √ q y∈Fq |x |s ⊕ y |t . We claim that the unique polynomial p satisfies the condition PreÕ(p) ≥ 1/q+ε. Since |X| = n and |F q −X| = q−n, it follows that PreÕ(p) = 1 q x∈Fq |α x,y | 2 = 1 q x∈X
Hence, we conclude that PreÕ(p) ≥ 1/q + ε. Now, consider the ε-QLDP for the GRS (n,k,q) with O. By our assumption, there exists a quantum list decoder A that solves this ε-QLDP with high confidence. To apply this A to find the hidden polynomial p, we need to realizeÕ from the given inputs (x 1 , . . . , x n , S 1 , . . . , S n ). This is done by generating the stateÕ|x i |s |t as follows: choose y in S i randomly and then generate the amplitude δ i,y / √ m. Therefore, we can solve the NPIP with high success probability. 
Bounded Distance Vector Problem
To construct a quantum list decoder for the generalized Reed-Solomon code against relatively small bias, it suffices to give a quantum algorithm to the following lattice problem.
Bounded Distance Vector Problem (BDVP)
• Input: m basis vectors b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m ∈ Z n and a radius ξ ∈ Q.
• Oracle: given a vector v ∈ Z n , returns the value v 2 = j∈[n] λ Proof. The following argument is owing to [2] . We want to construct an efficient quantum reduction to the BDVP from the QLDP for the (M, n, M − n + 1) q generalized Reed-Solomon code. This proves the proposition. = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ (F q ) n be any message and let p a (x) = n k=1 a k x k−1 be its codeword, i.e., the polynomial over F q of degree at most n − 1. Now, we assume that PreÕ(p a ) ≥ 1/q + ε. Note that p a satisfies the Lagrange's interpolation formula: 
